Authority in VC Reappointment: Legal Interpretation

Delve into a recent High Court judgment focusing on the interpretation of statutory provisions regarding Vice-Chancellor reappointments. The court’s thorough legal analysis dissects the procedural requirements for reappointment, clarifying the roles and powers of key authorities involved. The judgment sets a precedent for ensuring adherence to the law in such crucial appointments.

Facts

• The High Court at Calcutta allowed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of quo warranto against the Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University.
• The Division Bench held that the UGC Regulations envisage that the appointment of a VC can be made only by a Visitor/Chancellor, not by the State government.
• The High Court set aside the re-appointment of the VC by the State government as it held that the State government had no authority to re-appoint the VC under Section 8 or Section 60 of the Calcutta University Act 1979.
• The State government’s argument that re-appointment under amended Section 8(2)(a) did not require further selection process and only needed satisfaction of the State government, without the concurrence of the Chancellor, was rejected by the High Court.
• The State government recommended the VC’s re-appointment based on academic excellence and administrative success, stating the absence of a need for a fresh search committee for re-appointment.
• The High Court disagreed with the petitioner, stating that the procedure prescribed in Section 8(1) was not required to be followed for the re-appointment of a VC under amended Section 8(2)(a).
• The High Court examined the provisions of Section 8 of the Act in relation to the re-appointment of the VC.
• The High Court referred to the appointment and re-appointment processes outlined in the Act.
• The Court highlighted the powers vested in the Chancellor and the State government regarding the re-appointment of the VC.
• The Court analyzed the arguments presented by the petitioners and the State government regarding the re-appointment procedure.
• The Court considered the difference between initial appointment and re-appointment in the case of a VC.
• The judgment emphasized the criteria for re-appointment as per Section 8(2)(a) of the Act.
• The Court discussed the issuance of a writ of quo warranto in cases where eligibility criteria or statutory provisions are violated.
• The reasons provided by the High Court in support of its decision were outlined.

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Arguments

• Section 8(2)(a) does not take away the power of the Chancellor to appoint a VC under Section 8(1)(b)
• In effecting the reappointment of a VC, the procedure which is prescribed by sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of constituting a Search Committee needs to be followed
• The respondent’s argument was based on the interpretation of the contract terms.
• They claimed that the language used in the contract was clear and unambiguous.
• The respondent argued that the plaintiff failed to meet their obligations under the contract.
• They also presented evidence to support their position.
• However, the court ultimately found in favor of the plaintiff.

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Analysis

• The amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a) do not transfer the power of reappointment from the Chancellor to the State government.
• The writ of quo warranto can be issued when an appointment is not in accordance with the law.
• Deletion of the words ‘subject to the provisions of this section’ in Section 8(2)(a) indicates that reappointment does not require the search committee and panel preparation as in a fresh appointment.
• The power of reappointment lies with the Chancellor, as stated in the provisions of the Act.
• The State government misusing Section 60 for ‘removal of difficulty clause’ to undermine the Chancellor’s appointment authority is not permissible.
• Misuse of the ‘removal of difficulty clause’ to bypass statutory provisions contradicts the rule of law.
• The State government was in agreement with the interpretation of the Act provided by the Chancellor.
• Misusing statutory provisions to avoid following the proper appointment process defeats the purpose of the legislation.
• Section 8(2)(b) empowers the Chancellor to allow a VC to continue, notwithstanding the expiration of its term, for a period of not more than two years at a time in consultation with the Minister.
• The continuation is subject to the satisfaction of the State government and based on past academic excellence and administrative success during the term of office as VC.
• Section 8(2)(a) provides for the term of office of a VC, eligibility for reappointment, the conditions for reappointment, and the outer age limit of 70 years.
• The power of reappointment is vested in the Chancellor, not the State government.
• Section 8(2)(a) establishes eligibility for reappointment for another four-year term based on academic and administrative performance during the VC’s previous term.
• Section 8(6) outlines the procedure for filling a vacancy in the office of the VC.
• Section 7(1) designates the Governor as the Chancellor of the University and head of the University.
• In case of temporary inability of a VC, provisions in Section 8(5)(a) allow for the appointment of a substitute.
• The appointment procedure for a VC involves the constitution of a search committee and the submission of a panel of three names to the Chancellor.
• Specific criteria for eligibility and appointment of a VC are detailed in Sections 8(1)(a), 8(1)(b), and 8(1)(c).
• The limitations of the writ of quo warranto were elaborated upon in the case of B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees’ Assn.
• In Gambhirdan K Gadhvi v State of Gujarat, it was observed that even if the provisions of the Act allowed the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the State government, it would be in violation of the UGC Regulations.
• The court emphasized the importance of reading statutory provisions holistically to imbue them with meaning and content without attributing redundancy to the legislature.
• In Union of India v Hansoli Devi, it was reiterated that brushing aside words in a statute as surplusage is not a sound principle if they can have appropriate application in conceivable circumstances.
• The UGC Regulations, being part of the statute framed by Parliament, were held to prevail in the case discussed here.
• Various precedents were cited to clarify the remit of the writ of quo warranto in the context of reappointments and existing incumbents fulfilling eligibility conditions.
• The judgment of the High Court is correct in law and on fact
• No interference in appeal is warranted

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Decision

• State government could not have issued the order re-appointing the VC
• No order as to costs
• The appeals are dismissed
• Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of

Case Title: STATE OF WEST BENGAL Vs. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS (2022 INSC 1068)

Case Number: C.A. No.-006706-006706 / 2022

Click here to read/download original judgement