Premeditated Brutality: Six Killed in Sleep, Supreme Court Calls Crime “Rarest of Rare”

This is an application under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“2015 Act”) requesting this Court to hold that the applicant, who is a convict for committing offences under Sections 302, 342, 397, 449 read with 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“1860 Code”) was a juvenile on the date 2 of commission of the offence. The appeal against the judgment of conviction and order of death sentence made by the applicant was dismissed by this Court on 5 September 2000. Though the offence was committed at Pune, the applicant claims to hail from Jalabsar, in Shri Dungargarh tehsil, at present in Bikaner district, Rajasthan.

Moreover, in certain other documents Niranaram’s age is shown to be different from that reflected in the said certificates. The applicant for the first time wanted a medical examination for determination of his age on 14 August 2005, when the Prison Inspector General, Western Division, Pune went to meet the applicant at Yerawada Central Prison. (unclear 3 line)

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Physical Development: Medium Teeth: Upper 15 6 Lower 15

Ht 5’9” Wt 68 kg Secondary Sex Characters Male: Moustache: Present Beard: Shaved Pubic Hair: Present Voice: normal Genitals: normal Medicolegal exam: X Ray plate no R180( 4) date: 23/8/05 (unclear medical description) Conclusion: From clinical & radiological examination the age of the patient on date 24/8/05’more than twenty two years but less than forty years (40 years)’ including margin of error.

Mercy Petition on behalf of a juvenile to the President Hon. Mercy Petition on behalf of a juvenile to the President Hon. Mercy Petition on behalf of a juvenile to the President Hon. Self to make you aware that one person names Niranaram Chetanram Chaudhary, born on 1/2/1982, who has been awarded the death penalty in a murder case in languishing in the Yerawada Central Prison, Pune. The prison authorities have also requested us that we should attract your attention to the fact that Niranaram Chetanram Chaudhary was a juvenile at the time of offence so that death penalty awarded is a mistake of the law. In a letter originating from the Superintendent, Yerawada Central Jail, Pune addressed to Additional Secretary, Home Department, Maharashtra (which is Annexure A-13 to the present application), the Jail authorities recorded that the Medical Superintendent, Sassoon hospital, Pune was intimated by the applicant that he had studied in a Government School at Jalabsar and his name in the school was Niranaram. Accordingly, the said prisoner was sent to the Hon Medical Superintendent, Sassoon Hospital, Pune and the he was requested through letter NV1/ AVT/ 64/ 2007 date 8/1/2000 to give a medical report about the age of the prisoner.

In this petition, apart from the aforesaid certificates, the applicant had relied on a “Family Card” of the Rajasthan Government issued in 1989, recording the age of Nirana to be of 12 years as also the aforesaid Transfer Certificate issued on 15 August 2001 recording Niranaram’s date of birth as 1 February 1982. (Criminal) No 126 of 2013, was dismissed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court on 12 August 2013 with the following order:- “UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R “We are not inclined to entertain this Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the same is dismissed.” This application was instituted on 30 October 2018. The applicant – Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary has filed an application (Crl.M.P.No.5242 of 2016 in R.P.(Crl.)Nos.1139- 1140/2000 in Crl.A.Nos.25-26/2000) seeking review of the final judgment of this Court dated 05.09.2000 in Criminal Appeal Nos.25-26 of 2000, upholding his conviction under Sections 342, 397, 449 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the IPC’) and the sentence of death awarded to him under Section 302 IPC by reopening the Review Petition(Crl.)Nos.1139- 1140 of 2000, which were dismissed by this Court on 24.11.2000.

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Accordingly, we direct the Registry of this Court to send the application (Crl.M.P.No.157334/2018 in R.P.(Crl.) Nos.1139- 11 1140/2000 in Crl.A.Nos.25-26/2000) along with xerox copy of the documents, relied upon by the applicant, to the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pune to decide the juvenility of the applicant. List the matter immediately after receipt of report from the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pune.” In pursuance of direction of this Court, the Principal District and Sessions Judge (we shall henceforth refer to him as the “Inquiring Judge”) gave his report sustaining the applicant’s claim for juvenility. The Certificate of Date of Birth of Niranaram s/o Chetanram, dated 30/01/2019, issued by the Headmaster, Rajkiya Adarsh 12 Uccha Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Jalabsar, Shridungargarh (Bikaner). A Certificate of Bonafide resident dated 10/08/2009, issued by the Tahasildar, Shridungargarh, Bikaner in the name of Niranaram s/o Chetanram, resident of Jalabsar, Tahasil- Shridungargarh, District-Bikaner. Form issued by Rajkiya Madhyamik Vidyalaya Udrasar, Tahasil-Shridungargarh, District-Bikaner, dated 19/09/2003, in the name of Anadaram s/o Chetanram Sanatan. After the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 came into force, the relevant provision relating to the procedure to be followed is U/sec.9 of the Act. 40) The authorities of “Surendra Kumar -vs- State of Rajasthan [(2008) SCC OnLine Raj 138]” and “Shah Nawaz -vs- State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [(2011) 13 SCC 751]” are relevant with reference to the school record. 42) Therefore, if Rule 7 A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 is read with it’s Rule 12 and the present Section 9 and Section 94 of the Act, it is clear that, the date of birth from the school certificate or matriculation certificate or a certificate of Corporation etc.

Even as per document no.1, the date of birth of “Niranaram” is 01/02/1982. With regard to document at serial no.2 ( Annexure- ‘I-2’ ), the Police Officer found that the same was issued by the school whose stamp it bears. Hence, the documents at serial nos.1 to 3, has a genuine source and those are authentic documents.

Hence, though the certificate dated 15/08/2001 (document no.1) mentions the District Churu, by virtue of the notification dated 23/03/2001, village Jalabsar from Shridungargarh has been included into Bikaner District. As such, the certificates of documents at serial nos.4 and 5 can be said to have been issued by the Tahasildar Shridungargarh, District Bikaner. With regard to document at serial no.9 ( Annexure- ‘L-2’ ), it is a certificate in the name of “Andaram s/o Chetanram”. Copy of such school register was collected and the same has been produced by the Police Officer with his report.

The inquiry made by the Police Officer was misdirected since he was required to make inquiry with the Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Shridungargarh regarding Pariwar Card i.e. Moreover, the name of the village and District besides the name of father of “Niranaram” and “Andaram” is the same. document at serial no.8, is in the name of “Chetanram”. However, the signature of Sarpanch on the document collected by the Police Officer having reference to the statement of Kesraram and her signature on document at serial no. document at serial no.8, same is the position since “Anadaram” is appearing to be elder to “Niranaram”. There is nothing to show that, any other person by name “Niranaram Chetanram” was found at village Jalabsar. 54) If “Niranaram” is not “Narayan” and “Narayan” is some other person, then the State should have brought clear documentary evidence of school record of “Narayan” showing him to be different person.

If it is the age mentioned for the year 1989, then in the year 1994, more particularly on 24/08/1994, the age of the petitioner would be 16 years and 8 months. He has also submitted that the applicant is relying on records pertaining to another individual as at no point of time earlier he had disclosed that his real name was Niranaram. Namrata had stated that admission number 1317 (which was recorded in the transfer certificate of Mukhram) did not bear the name of Mukhram in school records but the admission number 1317 was in the name of one Babulal Shreechandanmal Bhadani, whose date of birth was 6 June 1966. Patil that the family members of the applicant had obtained the residence certificate of Niranaram by affixing the photo as also the caste certificate on 10 August 2009 issued by the Tehsildar officer Shri Dungargarh when the applicant remained imprisoned. He wants us to distinguish the finding made by a Bench of two Judges of this Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra), referring to the judgment in the case of Abuzar Hossain alias Golam Hossain -vs- State of West Bengal [(2012) 10 SCC 489]. Having regard to the gruesomeness of the offence, and involvement of the applicant having been proved at all levels of judicial hierarchy, he has drawn our attention to the following passage from the case of Abuzar Hossain (supra):- “39.6 Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of juvenility or patently absurd or inherently improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by the court at the threshold whenever raised.” Patil has submitted that the entry number 550 relates to the incumbent entering class 4 on 16 August 1984 whereas entry number 551 shows the incumbent’s entry into class 1 on 4 September 1985.

On probative value of the entry in the admission register, he has relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi -vs- Anand Purohit [(1988) Supp SCC 604]. Even in the review petition, the applicant described himself as Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary. From the materials before us, we find that his identity as Niranaram Chetanram Chaudhary surfaced in early part of January 2006, as it would appear from Annexure A-7 to the application. The said communication to which we have referred earlier also describes the applicant as Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and his date of birth in this communication is shown to be 1 February 1982.

‘Family Card’ – issued by the State of Rajasthan to the father of the present Petitioner, dated 17.2.1992 which records the name of the present Petitioner as 26 ‘Nirana’ and his age as 12 years. ‘Ration Card’ – issued by the State of Rajasthan to the father of the present Petitioner which records the name of the present Petitioner as ‘Niranaram’. The present applicant in this writ petition has described himself as Narayan @ Niranaram, son of Chetanram Chaudhary and the same name has been used to describe the applicant in the present application. The applicant has sought to establish his identity as Niranaram relying on a series of documents where his father’s name has been shown as Chetanram. The Tehsildar of Shri Dungargarh Bikaner has also issued a certificate dated 10 August 2009 to the effect that Niranaram is bonafide resident of the Jalabsar and he has been referred to therein as son of Chetanram. The two transfer certificates (Annexures L-2 and L-3 of the report) of Anada and 29 Mukhram also carry the name of Chetanram as their father. The State has taken a plea that at the time of inquiry, sufficient time was not available to them to verify this fact. Our opinion on this point would not vary even if we reject the certificate of the Sarpanch. Same line of reasoning has been followed in the cases of Ram Narain -vs- State of Uttar Pradesh [(2015) 17 SCC 699] and Upendra Pradhan -vs-

Stae of Orissa [(2015) 11 SCC 124]. In the said judgment it has been held that once the plea of juvenility is rejected from the stage of Magistrate, the High Court and subsequently the Supreme Court, the convict cannot be permitted to reagitate that plea. In our opinion, on juvenility plea, if a writ petition is dismissed in limine, such order would not foreclose the option of an accused (or a convict) to make plea for juvenility under sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the 2015 Act.

This was a case under the 2000 Act, but under the said Act also, provisions of Section 7A thereof is similar to Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. As per this judgment, in case the claimant is found to be juvenile, Court has to refer the matter to the Board for passing appropriate order and in such a situation, sentence passed by the Court shall have no effect. Anwar (supra) and Surajdeo (supra), (in the latter case, author of this judgment was a party), two Coordinate Benches of this Court opined that mitigating circumstances like juvenility of age ordinarily ought to be raised in trial itself and belated raising of such plea may also underline the lack of genuinity of the defence case. Procedure in inquiries, appeals and revision proceedings.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by this Act, a Committee or a Board while holding any inquiry under any of the provisions of this Act, shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and subject thereto, shall follow, as far as may be, the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for trial of summons cases. Presumption and determination of age.—(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. It is apparent that the Inquiring Judge has conducted the inquiry typically as a fact-finding inquiry is conducted and has not followed the procedure of summons trial. Under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act the Court also has been empowered to make an inquiry if the Court itself is of opinion that the person was the child on the date of the commission of offence. The Inquiring Judge himself applied his mind considering the submissions of the prosecution as also the learned advocate of the applicant and the applicant himself was produced before the Inquiring Judge. Before the Inquiring Judge, we find that in addition to the documents annexed to the application, a certificate of date of birth issued by the 39 school authority was also furnished by the applicant.

(3) If the court finds that a person has committed an offence and was a child on the date of commission of such offence, it shall forward the child to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if any, passed by the court shall be deemed to have no effect. So far as the present case is concerned, this Court had directed inquiry to be conducted by the Inquiring Judge at the first level, before whom the applicant and the prosecution had sufficient opportunity to present their version. She has stated:-

“With reference to aforesaid, the name of Niranaram s/o Chetanram, Jalabsar has been recorded in the Student Admission Register of our Rajkiya Adarsh Higher Secondary School, Jalabsar, Shreedungargad at Student Admission No. Section 7-A has used the expressions “court shall make an inquiry”, “take such evidence as may be necessary” and “but not an affidavit”.

The word “inquiry” has not been defined under the JJ Act, but Section 2(y) of the JJ Act says that all words and expressions used and not defined in the JJ Act but defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. (h) ‘investigation’ includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;” The expression “trial” has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure but must be understood in the light of the expressions “inquiry” or “investigation” as contained in Sections 2(g) and 2(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We find in very many cases that the court/the Juvenile Justice Board while determining the claim of juvenility forget that what they are expected to do is not to conduct an inquiry under Section 2(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but an inquiry under the JJ Act, following the procedure laid down under Rule 12 and not following the procedure laid down under the Code. In many of the cases, we have come across, it is seen that the criminal courts are still having the hangover of the procedure of trial or inquiry under the Code as if they are trying an offence under the penal laws forgetting the fact that the specific procedure has been laid down in Section 7-A read with Rule 12. Only in the absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs to obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). Once the court, following the abovementioned procedures, passes an order, that order shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or juvenile in conflict with law. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of business. The expression “inquiry”, in the manner in which it has been used in the 1973 Code cannot be transplanted in toto so far as the 2015 Act is concerned, to fit the meaning of inquiry therein. This authority does not come into conflict with ratio of the decision in the case of Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra), to the extent the latter judgment explains the meaning and implication of the expression “inquiry” under the 2000 Act and Rules made thereunder.

46 So far as Section 94 of the 2015 Act is concerned, though the said provision deals with determination of age of a juvenile-claimant by the Committee or the Board, in our opinion the documents or tests referred to therein would guide the Court as well in making inquiry of such nature. If an application is filed before the court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub- section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of Section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. Hence the degree of proof required in such a proceeding before the JJ Board, when an application is filed seeking a claim of juvenility when the trial is before the criminal court concerned, is higher than when an inquiry is made by a court before which the case regarding the commission of the offence is pending (vide Section 9 of the JJ Act, 2015). However, the documents mentioned in Rules 12(3)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the JJ Rules, 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. The documents on which he has primarily relied upon are the school register, certificate of date of birth of Niranaram issued by the school authorities on 30 January 2019 and transfer certificate dated 15 August 2001.

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The school documents point to Niranaram’s age to be below 16 years in the year of commission of offence.

In the cases of Manoj alias Monu alias Vishal Chaudhary -vs- State of Haryana and Another [(2022) 6 SCC 187], Ravinder Singh Gorkhi (supra) and Birad Mal Singhvi (supra) the necessity of the documents being reliable has been stressed for 51 determining the juvenility claim. As regards authenticity or genuineness of the admission register, 52 which forms the basis of certificate of the applicant’s date of birth, argument of Mr. He has also referred certain other entries in the register prior in order to serial no. But these entries, at best, would show some defect in maintaining the records and cannot lead to the conclusion that the entire admission register is fabricated. But these are nitpicking submissions and cannot lead to the conclusion that 53 admission register itself is fake. Even if the register has been freshly stitched and paginated to be sent to this Court, that would not lead to a conclusion that the whole thing has been fabricated. Next is the age reflected in the electoral roll and if one goes by that, then his age at the time of commission of offence would be 19 years.

However, in a case where plea of juvenility is found unscrupulous or the materials lack credibility or do not inspire confidence and even, prima facie, satisfaction of the court is not made out, we do not think any further exercise in this regard is necessary. If the plea of juvenility was not raised before the trial court or the High Court and is raised for the first time before this Court, the judicial conscience of the Court must be satisfied by placing adequate and satisfactory material that the accused had not attained the age of eighteen years on the date of commission of offence; sans such material any further enquiry into juvenility would be unnecessary. In the case of Pawan (supra) school leaving certificate issued by the headmaster of a school did not inspire the confidence of the Court. But this authority does not lay down, as an absolute proposition of law, that belated production of age proof cannot be examined to determine juvenility of an accused.

The ratio of the case of Surajdeo Mahto (supra) would also not apply in the facts of this case as in this proceeding the Inquiring Judge has gone into the question as to whether the certificates relied upon by the applicant belonged to him or not and has returned a finding that Niranaram was indeed Narayan.

Case Title: NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (2023 INSC 298)

Case Number: R.P.(Crl.) No.-001139-001140 / 2000

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