The first, second and fifth 2 respondents are, hereafter, referred to (unless the context otherwise requires) as “Indian Army”; and the third and fourth respondents, as “IAF”. During this deployment and engagement, known as “Operation Parakram”, the appellant, who was a radar operative/ technician -with the IAF, was deployed at the border. The appellant alleges that 171 MH did not possess any facility to check markers of blood, including HIV before transfusion and the blood was indented from another military hospital – 166 Military Hospital (“166 MH”) as per the SoP on “ Adhoc Blood Bank ”. While undergoing treatment, his blood samples were taken and on diagnosis, the Lab reports (dated 21.05.2014 and 23.05.2014), revealed that the appellant was suffering from Human Immunodeficiency Virus (hereafter, “ HIV ”). On being dissatisfied with the decision of the first Medical Board, the appellant demanded a copy of the documents relating to his blood transfusion at 171 MH, Samba in July 2002; access was however refused by the respondents on account of their unavailability. Thus, Medical Boards were held on 12.12.2014 and 24.06.2015 and in terms of the medical board proceedings, the appellant’s disability was attributable to service owing transfusion of one unit of blood at 171 Military Hospital on 10th July 2002.
On 5 31.05.2016, the appellant was denied extension of services and was discharged from service, without the due proceedings of the Release Medical Board. That was denied to him by a letter dated 14.12.2016, which stated that no such provision exists for issuance of printed disability certificate in the format as desired by the appellant and subsequently on 29.08.2017, the appellant’s disability pension was sanctioned in addition to his service pension. It was further observed by the Appellate Authority that old documents (including the appellant’s medical records) have been destroyed as per the necessary policy and while disagreeing with the findings of the Release Medical Board (where HIV was attributed to the service), observed that in absence of any causative factor between blood transfusion and acquiring HIV infection, HIV infection cannot be attributed to the service and thus found no negligence on behalf of the hospital authorities.
Meanwhile, proceedings of the Court of Inquiry (CoI) were held on 01.07.2018 to investigate circumstances under which the appellant was transfused blood at the 171 Military Hospital, Samba and the CoI concluded by its findings 7 that blood provided to the appellant was duly screened for the HIV and other markers in vogue at the relevant time and on examination of all the witnesses, no negligence or lapse can be attributed on the part of physician or the support staff at the said military facility. It is further emphasized that Specialist Opinion given during RMB has not mentioned about history of any sexual exposure, administration of IV Fluids or injections or any prolonged Hospital treatment which are other modes of transmission by HIV in the intervening period between Jul 2002 to may 2014 (period between blood transfusion at 171 MH and detection as HIV positive). The Commission dismissed the appellant’s complaint and observed that no expert opinion was adduced or proved before it for establishing medical negligence during the blood transfusion against the respondent/opposite parties. The Commission also relied on provisions of Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct Etiquettes and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 (hereafter “ IMC Professional Conduct Regulations ”) to observe that the hospital facility was not bound to preserve the appellant’s medical records beyond the period of three years and thus there is no reason to believe that the authorities deliberately denied the appellant’s medical records to him.
By a letter order dated 25.04.2022, this court directed the respondents to submit the entire record pertaining to transfusion of blood on 10.07.2002 to the 9 appellant. The amici further argued that the respondents failed to provide any material evidence, such as the ELISA/HIV test and blood compatibility report of the blood unit that was transfused to the appellant in 2002, to demonstrate that they followed their own exhibited ‘Transfusion Medicine Technical Manual and Standard Operating Procedures’ that is to say that before any blood transfusion took place, it was compulsory to conduct an ELISA test of the blood unit to determine whether it was HIV infected or not, ensuring that it is safe for transfusion to HIV negative person. Kishan Rao v Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital & Another ; Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences v Prasanth S. (hereafter, “ Nizam 10 Institute of Medical Sciences ”), related to medical negligence, to support his contention that in cases of medical negligence, the burden of proof lies with the respondents and not with the appellant. Reference was made to Chapter 16 of “ The Guidelines for HIV Testing, March 2007 ”, published by the National AIDS Control Organisation, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, to highlight the importance of informed consent for HIV testing.
Different medical opinions, medical board proceedings, and official letters received by the appellant from respondents after his discharge from service, including the legal opinion of the command judge advocate, HQ SWAC, having categorically admitted the connection between the appellant’s disability contracted due to reasons attributable to service and the blood transfusion of 10.07.2002, were relied upon. The appellant argued that the respondents claimed to have no records related to the appellant and the blood transfusion pertaining to the year 2002, stating that they were destroyed. The respondents’ contradictory statements about not maintaining records beyond three years, while at the same time also producing documents that are 7 to 20 years old, further weaken their case. The appellant further argued that the HIV expert’s report cannot be considered as the said expert is a regular employee of the respondent’s organization, and hence his opinion cannot be free from biases. Additionally, the appellant referred to Guidelines on HIV Testing (March 2007) published by the National AIDS Control Organisation (hereafter “NACO”), which states that the disease’s rate of progression depends on viral characteristics and host factors, ranging from 1 year to more than 15-20 years. wherein, the court observed that a negative HIV test result for the accused does not necessarily mean they are not infected with HIV.
Chairman, Employee State Insurance Corporation (hereafter, “Kishore Lal”) ; Laxman Thamappa Kotgiri v G. It was further submitted that the transfusion, without seeking informed consent, without ensuring observance of minimum safeguards and later, stonewalling the appellant, denying access to his medical records, and even seeking to deny their liability, by holding a CoI, – the reason for whose setting up was only to discount previous medical certification- and the insinuations aimed at the appellant, caused him immense mental agony, for which suitable and deterrent compensation is warranted. Vikramjit Banerjee (hereafter “ASG”) submitted that the appellant failed to prove medical negligence attributable to the respondents and that no medical report submitted on record establishes negligence on their part. It was thus concluded that the services rendered by employee-medical officer to such a person would therefore continue to be service rendered free of charge and would be outside the purview of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act.” 34. It was further argued that Medical Boards are not the primary source of evidence in relation to the detection of HIV infection disease, and the test report dated 05.03.2014 must be considered as primary evidence. It was further argued that the appellant failed to show any causation between the blood transfusion and his eventually being infected with the virus.
Additionally, the respondents are not required to maintain the appellant’s medical record beyond a period of three years as per IMC Professional Conduct Regulations and there is no obligation to preserve the said medical documents beyond this period specially when 171, Military Hospital itself is a temporary hospital. Impugning the bona- fides of the appellant, it was argued that he had discovered HIV infection in the year 2014 itself but approached the Commission only in 2017 and the appellant had symptoms of immunodeficiency during 2002 and 2014. In the facts of this case, the appellant did not establish any definite causal relationship between infection in 2002 and his acquiring HIV positive status in 2014 as a direct and only result of his being admitted and given the blood transfusion in 171 MH. It was submitted that during the CoI, the concerned pathologist of 166 MH at the relevant time, produced records showing that two units of B- negative blood were indented to 171 MH on 12.01.2002.
It would be useful to extract the relevant regulation (applicable to Indian army personnel), which is contained in Regulation 173 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1973 (hereafter “ Army Pension Regulations ”): “173. Unless otherwise specifically provided, a disability pension may be granted to an individual who is invalided from service on account of a disability which is attributable to or aggravated by air force service and is assessed at 20 per cent or over. The Respondents are not in a position to point out any 22 Rules or Regulations, which can be said to be inconsistent with Regulation No 292 or 173, neither has any other Regulation been pointed out, which deals with the terms and conditions of service of ETF.” Further, the court had remarked, poignantly that: “23. Shantha”) : “This Court has dealt with all aspects of the medical profession from every angle and has come to the conclusion that the doctors or the institutes owe a duty to the patients and they cannot get away in case of lack of care to the patients. Another consequence of adopting a construction, which would restrict the protection of the Act to persons who can afford to pay for the services availed by them and deny such protection to those who are not in a position to pay for such services, would be that the standard and quality of services rendered at an establishment would cease to be uniform. All persons who avail the services by doctors and hospitals who give free service to poor patients but charge fee for others, are required to be treated on the same footing irrespective of the fact that some of them pay for the service and others avail the same free of charge.
His complaint was rejected, on the premise that the railway hospital where the treatment was given, was a part of his condition of service wherein he and his dependents were provided medical advice and treatment, free of charge. 681] and services rendered at government hospital/health centre/dispensary where no charge whatsoever is made from any person availing of the services and all patients are given free service [vide para 55(9)] on the one hand and service rendered to an employee and his family members by a medical practitioner or a hospital/nursing home which are given as part of the conditions of service to the employee and where the employer bears expenses of the medical treatment of the employee and his family members [para 55(12)] on the other. Shantha [(1995) 6 SCC 651] case was rendered by a larger Bench, we are of the opinion that it is open to this Court to follow the larger Bench which we will accordingly do.” Even in the case of employees who had contributed in part, the other contributions being from employers, under the Employees State Insurance Corporation scheme, this court had held that the services rendered by ESI hospitals were not gratuitous and that the ESI doctors fell within the ambit of the CPA 1986, in Kishore Lal (supra): “ 13. Wherever the charges for medical treatment are borne under the insurance policy, it would be a service rendered within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act. The person availing of such service under an insurance scheme of medical care, whereunder the charges for consultation, diagnosis and medical treatment are borne by the insurer, such service would fall within the ambit of “service” as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act. Shantha, this court had rejected, in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v Shiv Kumar Joshi : “We cannot accept the argument that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, being Central Government, cannot be held to be rendering “service” within the meaning and scheme of the Act.
Even if it is held that administrative charges are paid by the Central Government and no part of it is paid by the employee, the services of the Provident Fund Commissioner in running the Scheme shall be deemed to have been availed of for consideration by the Central Government for the benefit of employees who would be treated as beneficiaries within the meaning of that word used in the definition of “consumer”. In the latest decision, Joint Labour Commissioner v Kesar Lal, this court, dealt with the issue of whether a construction worker registered under the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and a beneficiary of the scheme made under the rules framed under the enactment, is a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the CPA 1986. The most celebrated decision is that of Nilabati Behara v State of Orissa, where the jurisdiction of the court was highlighted in the following terms: “‘a claim in public law for compensation’ for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is ‘distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort’ resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.” 54. Rudani, this Court examined the development of the law of mandamus and held as under: “[…] mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. The jural reach and plural range of that judicial process to remove injustice in a given society is a sure index of the versatile genius of law-inaction as a delivery system of social justice. This aspect, i.e., the court’s ability and jurisdiction to appreciate facts, really is uncontestable; even in writ proceedings, the so-called “hands off” bogey of “disputed questions of fact” which ordinarily constrain the courts, under Articles 32 and 226 from exercising jurisdiction, are to be seen in the context of the facts of each case. Therefore, in Gunwant Kaur v Municipal Committee Bhatinda (hereafter, “Gunwant Kaur”), this court held: “The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, even if they are in dispute and the present, in our judgment, is a case in which in the interests of both the parties the High Court should have entertained the petition and called for an affidavit-in- reply from the respondents, and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of relegating the appellants to a separate suit.” 57. This clearly shows that in an appropriate case, the writ court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition 30 even if the same arises out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some disputed questions of fact” The ratio of these decisions was also followed in Unitech v Telangana State Industrial and Infrastructural Development Corporation. When he felt discomfort, he was admitted to a Military Hospital Ahmedabad; the blood test did not indicate abnormality.
The medical board proceedings dated 11.06.2014 detected disability; however, it stated that the “disability is not attributable to service”. Based on this, and the medical record, the opinion of the board dated 21.12.2015 was that “Disability developed due to one unit of blood transfusion on 10 Jul 2002, 171 MH. This assessment was accepted by the IAF, which approved his medical fitness category and also rated his disability percentage on 22 January 2016 (by Group Capt. After instructing the relevant officials to trace the documents necessary to prepare the counter affidavit, to the appellant’s complaint, it was suggested that: “In view of the above, it is requested to order a C of I under the aegis of your HQ for the following: (a) to bring out the detailed facts pertaining to blood transfusion done at 171 MH in 2002 (b) To investigate and bring out the authority which provided the unit of blood and whether the same was duly screened as per the policy/guidelines in vogue at that time. What is clearly discernable from the proceedings in the CoI therefore, is that: (a) Many of the documents, pertaining to appellant’s treatment were denied, and repeatedly the respondents denied access to him.
These included a register containing details of the transfer of blood units from 166 MH to 171 MH. Jyoti Borpujari states that 171 MH was transferred one unit of B Negative blood on 12.01.2002; she further deposed that there was no other record of transfer of blood to 171 MH later, or during July 2002. (b) No records are available at 171 MH pertaining to screening of blood for HIV, Blood demand and Blood transfusion during the period Jun-July 2002. (c) No records are available at 166 MH regarding issue of blood during the period Jun-July 2002. As per SOP the Blood was screened tor HIV infection at 166 MH and then issued to 171 MH Samba. However, the number of these cells may not return to its original level.” The second stage is described as follows: “After the acute stage has ended — and if the person has not received treatment — the virus remains active, reproducing at very low levels but continuing to damage immune cells. The Guidelines on HIV Testing issued by Central Government, the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Na tional Aids Control Organization (NACO), March 2007 similarly describes the second phase as the “latent phase” and “the asymptomatic stage”, a “period on average lasts for 8-10 years.” According to those guidelines, the long-term survival of most afflicted persons (80-90%) was 10 years or more, and a small percentage (5%) “do not experience clinical progression of HIV.” Such persons are described as “long term non- progressors (LTNPs)”.
A review of the evidence and the materials on record reveals that the appellant was transfused with one unit of blood on 10 July 2002, at the advice of Lt. By all accounts, the appellant really had no choice because the transfusion took place under medical advice. In India, medical negligence is said to have been established by an aggrieved plaintiff or complainant when it is shown that the doctor or medical professional was in want of, or did not fulfil the standard of care required of her or him, as such professional, reasonably skilled with the science available at the relevant time. In United Kingdom itself, the duty of care has evolved beyond the Bolam approach; in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital and more significantly, in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (the latter decision drawing upon the reasoning of the Australian High Court in Rogers v Whittaker ), the UK Supreme Court outlined the duty of a doctor, surgeon or physician, and address the right of a patient as follows: “An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. Thirdly, during the testimony of witnesses i.e., before the CoI, 171 MH and 166 MH, there was no specific mention about what kind of markers were used to determine whether the transfused blood was in fact safe. In these circumstances, the normal duty of care which would have ordinarily applied and did apply as well, was that at both ends i.e., 166 MH and 171 MH, there should have been no doubt that blood had been filtered and found safe for transfusion.
It means essentially a case which calls for some answer from the defendant and will arise upon proof of: (1) the happening of some unexplained occurrence; (2) which would not have happened in the ordinary course of things without negligence on the part of somebody other than the claimant; and (3) the circumstances point to the negligence in question being that of the defendant, rather than that of any other person” 6-26 The third requirement is usually fulfilled by showing that the instrument causing the damage was in the management and control of the defendant at the time of the occurrence, but this is not essential. In such a case it is for the respondent to prove that he has taken care and done his duty to repel the charge of negligence.” All these facts and circumstances, in the opinion of this court, prove and establish that by reasonable standards of evidence, the appellant has justified the invocation of the principle of res ipsa loquitor. [..] in a case involving medical negligence, once the initial burden has been discharged by the complainant by making out a case of negligence on the part of the hospital or the doctor concerned, the onus then shifts on to the hospital or to the attending doctors and it is for the hospital to satisfy the Court that there was no lack of care or diligence.” Earlier, in Savita Garg (supra), the court had ruled that once the complainant or aggrieved party had adduced some evidence that the patient suffered (or died, as in that case) due to lack of care (or as in this case, suffered irremediable injury due to want of diligence) “then the burden lies on the hospital to justify that there was no negligence on the part of the treating doctor or hospital. In Asha Jaiswal (supra), this court outlined the caution needed to apply res ipsa loquitur: “an application of the general method of inferring one or more facts in issue from circumstances proved in evidence”. Res ipsa is only a means of estimating logical probability from the circumstances of the accident.” The above analysis leads this court to the conclusion that the condition in which the appellant found himself, was the direct consequence of the two hospital-establishments and their breach of the standards of care, resulting in the transfusion of the HIV positive infected blood into the appellant, which was the causative factor. At the one end is the duty of care – and establishing its breach, and thereby fault – and resultant injury. Ajay Kumar had discussed and declared the general principles relevant for the assessment of compensation or damages for personal injuries. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. This court, in Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences (supra), outlined, briefly, what damages a person who has suffered due to medical negligence, can be awarded. Sukumar Mukherjee (hereafter “Malay Kumar Ganguly”) and held that negligence of each treating contributory fact resulting in the patient’s condition, has to be seen: “in a case of this nature, the court must deal with the consequences the patient faced, keeping in view the cumulative effect.” Malay Kumar Ganguly (supra) is also an authority for the reasoning that while awarding compensation, the court should consider “ loss of earning or profit up to the date of trial” including any loss “already suffered or is likely to be suffered in future”. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the Tribunal or a court has to be broad-based. In the non-pecuniary heads, the compensation can be computed for the mental and physical pain and sufferings in the present and in future, loss of amenities of life including loss of marital bliss, loss of expectancy in life, inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration, mental agony in life, etc.” 80. )” calculated @ 5,44,526 /-; plus a sum of 10,89,052 multiplied by 12 (number of years left, till the age of 58 years) 2,80,97,541. Even if the appellant’s calculation about loss of future earnings were to be taken into account, given that he has been a pensioner, for the past 7 years, adjustment of the base compensation figure for compensation for loss of earnings has to be given. The total amount, (i.e., 35,00,000/- plus 80,64,000/-) would be 1,15,64,000/- (Rupees 46 one crore fifteen lakhs sixty four thousand only). In the present case, there are multiple facts, which in the opinion of this court, establish that the appellant suffered from callousness and insensitivity of the respondents, who persisted in being in denial. 14.01.2017 20.02.2017 RTI filed by appellant regarding allotment of service quarter/married accommodation and the IAF replied, in the reply to the appellant’s RTI query, that service quarter/married accommodation was allotted to a married air-warrior to live out with his family after registration for married accommodation by the respective individual and brought within authorized married establishment as per seniority in waiting list. The reply was that no such records are available with the hospital as same fell under exemption under Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, 2005 and the respective records were forwarded to respective records office after discharge from the hospital. 18.06.2017 18.08.2017 An RTI was filed on 18 Jun 2017 wherein amongst other things, appellant asked for maximum age an airman can serve in IAF and when will seventh pay commission be effective from. 27.04.2019 Date Unclear RTI application dated 27.04.2019 to CPIO Food Corporation of India wherein he asked for reasons for exclusion of HIV category patients from the category of Persons with Disability and reference was made to a reply letter dated 29.05.2018. 18.07.2019 16.08.2018 On 18 July 2019, Appellant filed RTI application for written correspondence between Air Force and Registrar at 171 MH Medical facility in respect of his letter dated 21 Jul 2014 and 16 Sep 2014.
31.07.2022 11.08.2022 Another RTI dated 31.07.2022 filed by appellant to ECHS Cell, Station headquarters, Ajmer asking for his eligibility to become ECHS (Ex- Service Contributory Health Scheme) and it was replied vide letter dated 11.08.2022 that no provision exist by which Appellant can become member of ECHS prior to retirement which falls on 49 31.05.2016, and even after retirement, Appellant had to register himself to become a member of the ECHS and it was never mentioned in office letter dated 25.07.2022 that he had become member of ECHS from his date of retirement i.e. 24.07.2022 11.08.2022 RTI application dated 24 Jul 2022 filed by the appellant asking if any circular/letter/memorandum/order exists which exempts defense personnels from complying with NACO circular and guidelines to which it was responded vide letter dated 11 Aug 2022 that no such circular/order/memorandum/letter exists. Hospital replied that though they have facility for laboratory test for HIV RNA for HIV defense personnel, however lab does not have facility for CD 4 counts.
The court not only granted damages under the head of mental agony, but also towards past medical expenses, and future medical expenses, after factoring an annual inflation rate of 1% per annum. Whilst individuals’ roles cannot be pinpointed, the overall inference one is left to draw is overwhelming prejudice- despite the appellant’s unblemished track record of service in the IAF. The respondents cannot be fastened with liability on that score, however, at the same 51 time, it would be relevant to highlight that Parliament has enacted the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017 (hereafter, “ HIV Act ”) which protects and promotes the rights of persons affected by HIV and AIDS. Section 34 of the HIV Act imposes obligations upon courts to anonymise the name of the individual concerned affected by HIV positive or AIDS, and also expedite legal proceedings. Acute symptoms can include: (a) fever (b) chills (c) night sweats (d) diarrhea; (e) headache (f) muscle aches (g) joint pain (h) sore throat (i) rash (j) swollen lymph nodes (k) mouth or genital ulcers Chronic HIV infection The next stage is called the chronic infection stage. In turn, an HIV-positive person may develop related infections, such as pneumonia Without treatment for HIV, advanced disease puts an HIV-positive person at an even greater risk for infectious complications, such as tuberculosis and a fungal infection called pneumocystis jiroveci pneumonia (PJP). PAH is a type of high blood pressure in the arteries that supply blood to the lungs. Even conservatively calculated, such a helper would have to be paid about 10,000/- to 15, 000/- per month. Furthermore, the appellant shall be entitled to bi- monthly medical check-ups at the relevant departments, in the Research and Referral Centre (R&R) in New Delhi; for that purpose, the respondents shall ensure that the necessary travel expenses, in accordance with the appellant’s entitlement are disbursed. Any flagging from these standards – as the multiple instances in the present case have established, only entails a loss of confidence in the personnel, 55 undermines their morale and injects a sense of bitterness and despair not only to the individual concerned but to the entire force, leaving a sense of injustice. The present case has demonstrated again and again how dignity, honour and compassion towards the appellant were completely lacking in behaviour by the respondent employer. 2) The Central Government shall issue necessary guidelines in respect of protocols for HIV and AIDS relating to diagnostic facilities, Anti- retroviral therapy and opportunistic Infection Management applicable to all persons and shall ensure their wide dissemination at the earliest, after consultation with all the concerned experts, particularly immunologists and those involved in community medicine, as well as experts dealing with HIV and AIDS prevention and cure. By reason of Section 16 (2) of the HIV Act, the parents or guardians of children affected by HIV and AIDS, or any person acting for protecting their interest, or a child affected by HIV and AIDS may approach the Child Welfare Committee [within the meaning of that expression under Section 29 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000] for the safe keeping and deposit of documents related to the property rights of such 57 child or to make complaints relating to such child being dispossessed or actual dispossession or trespass into such child’s house.
Case Title: CPL ASHISH KUMAR CHAUHAN (RETD.) Vs. COMMANDING OFFICER & ORS
Case Number: CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 7175 OF 2021 (2023INSC857)
