Following the allotment, a lease deed was executed with JKSL by the Collector, Kota, and permission was granted for setting up its industrial units in the area. Just after the first allotment was initially made, the State Government exercised its powers under Section 100 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and formulated the Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules, 1959 (“1959 Rules”) to regulate the allocation of land to entrepreneurs and the development of industrial areas across the State.
Provided that the allotment of land for the purpose of setting up of Common Effluent Treatment Plant and related activities, anywhere in the State, shall be made by the State Government in the Revenue Department for a period of 10 years which shall be extendable for a period of 5 years. Provided that the State Government, on the application of the lessee for establishment of industry other than the industry for which the was given, may grant permission for establishment of such industry. The lessee shall have no right to sell the land: (i) Provided that the land can be pledged as collateral security only in favour of Industrial Financial Corporation of India, Rajasthan Finance Corporation, IDBI, ICICI, LIC, IRBI, HDFC, SIDBI, EXIM Bank, Co- operative Banks and any Public Financial Institution as defined in the Public Financial Institute Act or Scheduled Banks or private lending agencies subject to ensuring that the lessee has cleared all the outstanding dues of the lessor and the lessee creates first charge in favour of the State Government and second to the financing body or bodies.
(a) In case of government land allotted under these rules, he shall pay 50% of prevailing market price of land after deducting allotment price charged under rule 3A and the transferee shall pay 50% of excess amount of yearly lease land mentioned in rule 5 and other conditions of lease shall be remained unchanged. (iiia) Provide also that if any industrial plot is divided or sub-divided without obtaining prior permission of the State Government, the lessee shall apply for permission of division or sub-division to the allotting authority along with a copy of the challan depositing an amount of Rs.3000/-. (c) that the transferee shall pay additional 100 percent excess amount of the proportionate yearly lease rent applicable from the date of transfer of right or interest in leased land.
v)
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The lessee shall set up, construct, erect and build on the said plot of land, only such buildings, sheds, and structures as are required by him for setting up the industry aforesaid and also such other residential quarters e.g. While the above stated leases were subsisting, the Rajasthan State Industrial and Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. The Government Order dated 18.09.1979 and Joint Director’s Order dated 28.09.1979, warrant reproduction: “Government of Rajasthan Industry Group-2 Department No.P-4 56/Industry/1/79Jaipur, Dated: 18.9.79 Order It has been decided in the meeting dated 18.09.1979 of Rajasthan State Level Planning and Development Coordination Committee that all the industrial areas of Rajasthan shall only be developed through Rajasthan State Industrial and Mining Development Corporation. Industry (Group-I) Department, A.P.4 (56) Industry/1/79 dated 18.09.1979 and Director, Department of Industry, Rajasthan, Jaipur DO letter No.F.2 (182) 9A/2305 dated 21.09.1979, the following Industrial Areas (Departmental) are hereby transferred to Rajasthan State Industrial and Mining Development Corporation Ltd., Jaipur w.e.f.
The contents of the 1979 Rules, under which RIICO would carry out its activities in terms of industrial areas allotted to it, that are important for our purposes may also be noted at this stage: “20-A. 20-C xxx xxx xxx (A) Following riders/conditions will be observed while considering the change in land use: i) No change in land use of allotted plots will be permitted for residential purpose. vi) Change of land use of the allotted plots for commercial/institutional purposes as permitted under this rule will be considered only for the plots located on the roads having right of way of 18.00 mtr. or Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation for setting up and developing Industrial Areas, on the following terms and conditions :- (i) The land shall be allotted on lease hold basis for a period of 99 years; (ii) The premium to be charged for the allotment of government land for industrial purposes shall be equivalent to the prevailing market price of the same class of agricultural land in the vicinity and shall be determined accordingly by the Colonization Commissioner in the Rajasthan Canal Project Colony Area and by the Collector concerned in other areas: Provided that no premium for allotment shall be charged from Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation where the land has been purchased by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation or acquired for Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation after its incorporation and the compensation is paid by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation.
[or Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation] may sub-lease the leased land or part thereof, for industrial purposes including essential welfare and supporting services, p rovided that in the case of Diamond and Gem Development Corporation to who the land has already been leased out by RIICO for 99 years, the sub-lessee i.e. [or Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation] may levy and recover such lease rent and other charges as may be determined by it, in respect of the lands sub-leased by it; (vi) The periods of the sub-leases by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. Jaipur or Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation shall be empowered to make allotment in accordance with the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Disposal of Land Rules, 1979 [or any other rules framed by the RIICO and RTDC for the purpose] of vacant plots to entrepreneurs in the Industrial Areas notified by the State Government and transferred to the said Corporation. or Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation shall be empowered to grant written permission to the lessee for transfer of rights or interest in the land in respect of the plots/land located in the Industrial Areas notified by the State Government and transferred to the said corporation: Provided further that any permission granted or action taken for transfer of rights or interest in the plots/land by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd.
The Collector was referring in this context to the deposit of lease rent and to whom the rent in question should go: “Therefore, guide in this regard that the above- mentioned notification dated 13-07-1982, the lease rent etc. In response to this, a notification was issued by the State Government on 23.05.1987, clarifying that Rule 12 of the 1959 Rules, added on 13.07.1982, would not apply retrospectively and the lease rent and other items pertaining to different deeds would remain a state subject. Further, documents in this regard would be retained by the District Industries Centre, and not RIICO: “Government of Rajasthan Industries (Group-1) Department 1.
Lease deed of the allotted land under Rajasthan Industrial Area Allotment Rules, 1959 is to be executed by District Collector/ General Manager, District Industries Centre. IPI/P-3(24)47/95 Dated:- 27-01-1995 Circular Sub:- Proceeding in respect of land under Rajasthan Industrial Area Allocation Rules, 1959. It will be clear from this that under the Rajasthan Industrial Area Allocation Rules, 1959 the District Industry Center/Collector (Industry) will have the right and responsibility to take action in respect of violation of the terms of the lease deed.
However, in the 1990s, JKSL encountered financial difficulties and was eventually declared a “sick company” by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (“BIFR”) on 02.04.1998, under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (“SICA”). It is further agreed that while APPL will take over all the liabilities pertaining the workmen/employees of Sir Padampat Research Centre, as determined as per Annexure B even though the SPRC unit will not be transferred to APPL and will be retained by JKSL. xxx xxx xxx” The rest of the agreement contains numerous clauses that are in furtherance of the absorption of the workers into Respondent No 1’s operations that were to start after the demerger of defunct units owned by JKSL. Respondent No 1, as part of the aforementioned JV between itself and JKSL, continued to coordinate with the State Government on shifting the lease on LIA, Kota, away from JKSL and to itself. Ltd… We request your goodself for an expeditious approval- (c) for split of lease deed dated 06/10/1982 in to 2 portions – one covering area of 37.16 acres pertaining to SPRC which is not to be transferred as the same will continue in the name of JKSL and another for balance land. Plot No 5A of 48.40 acres, meant for setting up a nylon plant and colony; ii) 2 Deed: Plot No 5B of 7.15 acres, for conducting R&D on acrylic fibre; iii) 3 Deed: Plot No 5C of 14.45 acres, for setting up a nylon tyre and cord plant; iv) 4 Deed: Plot No. Further, as also necessitated by the scheme, the aforementioned tripartite settlement agreements between Respondent No 1, JKSL, and the workers unions was to be given effect to. The relevant portions of the AAIFR scheme are worth reproduction: “9 Identification of JV Partner 9.1 The Arfat Group are identified by JKSL after an extensive search undertaken by the Company with the help of M/s Access International (Access) a Boston based consultancy Company…
The offshoot of this was a decade of litigation primarily involving the workers unions and Respondent No 1, regarding the latter’s failure to revive the industrial units as contemplated in the AAIFR scheme. The SLP by the Appellant Unions and others, was dismissed by this Court on 18.11.2016, and the subsequent Review Petitions were also rejected on 17.08.2017 and 06.03.2018, respectively, affirming that no directions could be issued to Respondent No 1 but also noting that the AAIFR plan should be executed. “ In the midst of the legal tussle between Respondent No 1 and the different workers unions, the former made an attempt to have an affordable housing scheme developed on the LIA, Kota, under the Chief Minister Jan Aavas Yojana. The proposals were considered by the Land Planning Committee constituted by RIICO on 03.10.2018 and approval was granted in-principle for the sub- division and conversion, as recorded in the Minutes of the Meeting issued by RIICO on 05.10.2018. The Kota branch of RIICO, however, proceeded to allow sub-division of the LIA, Kota, as requested by Respondent No 1, on 05.07.2019.
RIICO issued orders on 11.10.2019 and 14.10.2019, to finally cancel the permission for conversion of land, as well as cancel the supplementary leases themselves that had been subsisting in the name of Respondent No 1. The State Government and its authorities objected to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that Article 138 of the AoA of RIICO were not statutory in nature and, hence, a Writ could not be filed in this regard. Eventually, the Division Bench heard detailed arguments and passed the impugned judgment, concurring with Respondent No 1’s position. RIICO, given it was now in charge of these lands, had the authority under the 1979 Rules read with the Master Plan to allow conversion of land, if it was deemed necessary and appropriate; v) It appeared that Respondent No 1 had been specifically singled out and targeted; vii) Respondent No 1 had already spent significant amounts on the development of land, based on the supplementary lease deed and conversion that had been granted earlier. They sought to point out the flaws in the impugned judgment through the following arguments:- i) The land allotted to Respondent No 1 in LIA, Kota, always remained with the State Government and was never allocated to RIICO despite the Order dated 18.09.1979 regarding industrial lands being moved under the control of RIICO. Hence, only the State of Rajasthan through the District Collector, Kota, and not RIICO, could have considered the proposal for conversion of the land and the execution of supplementary lease deeds. In this instance, JKSL had already been put in charge of the area in LIA, Kota, under the 1959 Rules; iv) Rule 8 of the 1959 Rules clearly states that the land in question is not to be used for any purpose other than the objective of industrial development.
The prior government and Respondent No 1 had acted in concert to hastily push through the process for changing the usage of the land, in defiance of the AAIFR scheme as well as the Model Code of Conduct, causing a loss to the public exchequer and stymying the industrial development of the Kota region; viii) The new government was well within its rights to examine the decisions by the previous ruling class, as held by this Court in Krishna Ballav Sahay & Ors. ; ix) As an arguendo, even if the land was deemed to be allocated to RIICO as per the Order dated 18.09.1979 and the Corporation was the competent authority to issue approvals and permissions vis–vis LIA, Kota, there was still no infirmity in the directions issued by the State of Rajasthan under Article 138 of the AoA. The State Government retained complete discretion to order RIICO to act according to its diktats in public interest; x) RIICO itself had subsequently taken a decision to not allow any conversion in terms of the usage of land. The money spent by Respondent No 1 on the land would not validate the contravention of the Master Plan for the LIA, Kota. The reasons for the cancellation were never provided and do not exist in either the file or the final decision. ii)
The Model Code of Conduct is irrelevant, as the application for conversion of the land to commercial, and permission for sub-division, was filed in August 2018, much before the election process even began. This was the only reason for the 2007 deeds to have been executed with the Collector and not RIICO; v) It is very clear that the land in LIA, Kota, had been transferred and allotted to RIICO and the Corporation was considered to be the sole authority, even by the State Government, which was capable of dealing with the land. vi) Under Section 100 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, the State Government had framed the 1959 Rules, which were meant to govern the allotment of industrial plots across the state and the grant of leases over these areas.
1, and the Motilal Padampat (Supra) decision cited by Appellants is, on the contrary, beneficial to Respondent No 1’s position; ix) The alteration in the ruling government cannot be the reason behind the cancellation of a decision taken by the earlier government. Governance is a continuous process and under the Constitution, there is no general power of review available to any government to examine, set aside, and recall the decisions of the earlier government. It was only after these facts were ascertained did the government reverse the decision by the earlier ruling party. Under Schedule I of the Rules of Business, the Minister for Industries is to take decisions in matters connected to RIICO and industrial matters such as the cancellation of the supplementary lease deeds and/or revocation of permissions. has cemented the mandatory nature of the Rules of Business; xii) Article 138 of the AoA of RIICO could not have been resorted to for directing cancellation of the supplementary lease deed and permission for using the land for commercial purposes. Unbridled and unfettered powers cannot be granted to the State Government to issue instructions to RIICO in this manner as it may be used brazenly and without paying heed to any procedure under law. The 1979 Rules were brought into force in the same year, and were meant to provide guidelines on the basis of which RIICO would carry out its functions, including permissions for sub-division, change of land use, and allotment of industrial areas.
The 1979 Rules were not only given statutory recognition by virtue of this mention in the 1959 Rules, but additionally, all the allotments done under the 1979 Rules also received statutory endorsement and recognition; xvii) In a similar matter concerning the Bharatpur Industrial Area, an allotment had been made by the Collector to Perfect Potteries. In the matter of all those industrial areas which were notified/developed by the State Government and came to be transferred to RIICO vide order dated 18.09.1979 and in view of subsequent amendment in Rajasthan Industrial Area Amendment Rule, 1959 vide notification dated 13.07.1982 by Insertion of rule 12. Given this, no other authority would be able to interfere in the sphere of activities that are regulated under the 1979 Rules; b) RIICO’s own authority derives from Rules 11A and 12 of the 1959 Rules, by virtue of which the State Government had vested the responsibility to develop industrial areas upon the Corporation; (c) RIICO, as a public sector undertaking, would not have been able to function in the manner in which it does if express authorization had not been provided. Moreover, the State of Rajasthan itself issued a circular on 19.03.2003 allowing conversion of industrial land for other purposes in order to promote economic growth, in light of the recession that had taken hold at the time; xx) The initial agreement for transfer of the lands from JKSL to Respondent No 1 was signed by the Collector, not because the State Government still had control, but rather because those were the requirements under SICA and the AAIFR scheme. Respondent No 1 has consistently acted in consonance with the approach that RIICO has control over the land and the corresponding power to take further measures in respect of it, such as for conversion of use and sub- division of plots; xxi) The letter dated 12.01.1995 relied upon by Appellants as a proof that the title over the land was retained by the State Government was later overridden by a letter dated 31.03.1995. In fact, the Collector had sought the opinion of RIICO in the matter, clearly showing the Collector’s own conviction that consent needed to be sought from the Corporation; xxiii) The lack of a show cause notice or an opportunity to Respondent No 1 to defend itself is fatal to the Appellants’ case. This Court in its earlier order in the context of the petitions filed by the workers unions had already affirmed that SICA would not apply to Respondent No 1, given it was not a “sick company”. Singhvi, provided the following rebuttals in their rejoinder, besides reiterating their earlier arguments once again: – i) The act of the new government, following elections, going into the decisions of the earlier ruling party is legally acceptable. The State Government has acted in pursuance of its mandate and obligation in this matter; iv) RIICO is nothing more than a company and the 1979 Rules are framed under its AoA. The State Government always continued to manage and control the subject land under the 1959 Rules. Whether the LIA, Kota has been always under the management and control of the State Government or it was transferred to RIICO pursuant to Government Order dated 18.09.1979? The said allotment was made by the State Government in furtherance of its industrial policy, read with the power traceable to the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. Under this lease, the lessee was obligated to use the allotted land for the prescribed industrial purpose, failing which the land was liable to be reverted “to the lessor”. This jural relationship was further cemented between the State and Respondent No.1 when 7 fresh lease deeds were executed in favour of Respondent No.1 by the State Government through the Collector, Kota. The Government Order further declared that “the industrial areas operated by the Department of Industry shall be handed over to Rajasthan State Industrial and Mining Development Corporation Limited, Jaipur w.e.f. In purported compliance of the above-mentioned Government Order dated 18.09.1979, the Joint Director, District Industrial Centre, Kota issued an Order on 28.09.1979 (also reproduced in para 9) thereby transferring certain industrial areas to the Corporation including “Large Scale Industrial Area, Kota”.
After subjecting the allottees with the levy of Development Charges, the State Government as a lessor was obligated to provide all amenities in the industrial area on the principle of quid pro quo. There is no hidden treasure lying underneath Government Order dated 18.09.1979 to infer a non-existent consequence like vesting of lessor’s rights in RIICO in respect of LIA, Kota. The Rule provides that the land shall be allotted to RIICO on a leasehold basis and RIICO shall be free to sub-lease the land on agreed terms and conditions. We have no reason to doubt that Rule 11A, per se, does not advance the cause of Respondent No 1 for the reason that Respondent No 1 has merely stepped into the shoes of JKSL and lease deeds were executed in the year 2007 directly by the State Government in favour of Respondent No.1, without resorting to Rule 11A, namely, through RIICO. As laid down very clearly under Rule 11A, the allotment to RIICO is done purely on a leasehold basis, and ownership and title remain unequivocally with the State Government.
The second part of Rule 12 says that RIICO “shall also be authorised” to execute lease deeds, realize development charges, lease rent and other dues from the entrepreneurs to whom plots had already been allotted under the 1959 Rules. The second part of Rule 12 also does not fortify the claim of Respondent No 1 for the reasons that:- (a) lease deeds in favour of JKSL had been already executed in the year 1967 before Rule 12 came into force; (b) no part of the land in dispute was ever allotted to RIICO under Rule 11A of the 1959 Rules; (c) Respondent Another argument raised by Respondent No 1 was that the transfer lease deeds were signed pursuant to the requirement of Rule 9(iv) of the 1959 Rules, which necessitates a sign off by the State Government for transfer of land from one company to another, when the entity that possessed the lease is declared a sick company. Since, the 1967 and 2007 lease deeds in favour of JKSL and Respondent No 1, respectively, were executed by the State Government in terms of Rule 2 of the 1959 Rules, RIICO had no authority whatsoever to permit Respondent No 1 to change the land use or allow for the sub-division of plot without the prior approval of the State Government, which is the sole competent authority to accord such permission in exercise of its power under Rule 8 of the 1959 Rules.
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Not that we are dependent in any manner upon the understanding of the Government Order dated 18.09.1979 or Rules 8, 9, 11A and 12 of the 1959 Rules, by the State Government or RIICO.
The Company was brought into being under the Companies Act, 1956 by the State of Rajasthan, which holds 100% shares in it. On the other hand, an association of persons constituting themselves into a Company under the Companies Act or a Society under the Societies Registration Act owes its existence not to the Act of Legislature but to acts of parties though, it may owe its status as a body corporate to an Act of Legislature. RIICO does not owe its existence to a statute, but is rather created under the Companies Act and is subject to its provisions. It is only governed by the provisions of the Companies Act and not created by it. Regulation 19(7)(xvi) of Maharashtra Regulations which is a statutory regulation makes it obligatory for the Municipal Council to follow the provisions of the Code. Assuming that the Regulations under the Act stood repealed, the Code which was framed by the Maharashtra Government continued to hold the field.
It is for the State Government to frame the Code in whatever’ manner it likes but once the Code is in operation its provisions have to be followed by the Municipal Council Hinganghat under the mandate of Regulation 19(7)(xvi) of Maharashtra Regulations. In fact, the legal force of the Code was bestowed upon it by the reference in Regulation 19(7)(xvi) of the Maharashtra Regulations, which were statutory in nature. Respondent No 1, while vehemently objecting to the usage of Article 138 of RIICO’s AoA to issue directions to the Corporation for cancellation of the supplementary lease deeds and attendant approvals/permissions, has equated such directions by the State Government to a “farman” whereby any semblance of procedure and due process are abandoned to its own prejudice.
Singhvi cited before us the well-known decisions of this Court… to urge that even an administrative decision must be arrived at after taking into account all relevant considerations and eschewing irrelevant considerations and that the reasons for an order must find a place in the order itself and those reasons cannot be supplemented later by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit or otherwise. The submission was that neither the Cabinet memorandum of January 7, 1981 nor the Cabinet Memorandum of September 9, 1981 revealed that relevant considerations had been taken into account. It is important to note that unlike Mohinder Singh Gill’s case where that Court was dealing with a Statutory Order made by a statutory functionary who could not therefore, be allowed to supplement the grounds of this order by later explanations, the present is a case where neither a statutory functions nor a statutory functionary is involved but the transaction bears a commercial though public character which can only be settled after protracted discussion, clarification and consultation with all interested persons. It was in this factual background, coupled with the fact that the deliberations had been going on for around 2 years, that the Court was satisfied that relevant considerations had been appropriately accounted for.
For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power… ” 74. The permissions accorded by RIICO in favour of Respondent No 1 did not confer any rights whatsoever, much less any enforceable right in the eyes of law.
On the face of these findings, the question that arises is whether Respondent No 1, which actively participated in RIICO’s decision making process and secured benefits without any authority in law, can be permitted to complain of a deprivation of the opportunity of being heard. In any case, we have carried out an in-depth analysis of the entire gamut of documents and statutory rules, and have come to a firm conclusion that it was the State Government alone which was competent to accord necessary permissions to Respondent No 1 under the 1959 Rules, and not RIICO in purported exercise of its powers under the 1979 Rules. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. Thus, no legally vested right of Respondent No 1 has been infringed and it has no legitimate ground to seek an opportunity to be heard in a matter strictly between RIICO and State Government. The State Government being the sole investor, its overriding powers have been acceded to by RIICO through Article 138 of its AoA. It is categorically provided in Article 138 that the State Government may issue “such directions or instructions……in regard to the affairs of the conduct of the business of the Company or Directors thereof…”. The very objective behind reposing power in the State Government under Article 138 of the AoA is to enable it to undo and annul the decisions taken by RIICO in the conduct of its business affairs, which the State Government may find is derogating from public interest or in conflict with its own policy. Rule 7(2) of the Business Rules of the Government of Goa states, that, no proposal which requires previous concurrence of Finance Department under the said Rule, but in which Finance Department has not concurred, may not be proceeded with, unless the Council of Ministers has taken a decision to that effect. Further Rule 7 of the Business Rules requires that no Department shall without the concurrence of the Finance Department issue any order which may involve any abandonment of revenue or involve expenditure for which no provisions have been made in the Appropriation Act or involve any grant of land or assignment of revenue or concession, grant, lease or licence in respect of minerals or forest rights or rights to water, power or any easement or privilege or otherwise have a financial implications whether involving expenditure or not. Nadkarni, has emphasized on Schedule I of the Rules of Business, under which the matters related to RIICO would be addressed by the Industries Department. The Minister for Industries is not expected to look into each individual matter pertaining to RIICO as this would render the entire working of government unviable intention. State of Gujarat : “ 7…Article 166(1) and (2) expressly envisage authentication of all the executive action and shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor and shall be authenticated in such manner specified in the rules made by the Governor. Having regard to the role assigned to the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the summit, the Rules of Business framed Under Article 166(3) meant for convenient transaction of the affairs of the Government, by allocation thereof among the Ministers, secures their collective participation in the administration of the governance of the State. In our case, the sign off from the Minister for Industries is clear from the authorization granted on 01.01.2019 to the sub-committee to look into the decisions of the prior government and RIICO.
The specific committee that was authorized to investigate RIICO and its alleged misuse of non-existent powers in favour of Respondent No 1, was a creation of the entire Council, including the Minister for Industries. it was opined that: “ 8…It is generally agreed that ‘legitimate expectation’ gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself he distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non- arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. When the entity purporting to exercise the powers of a lessor, RIICO in this case, does so without having the requisite legal status to act in this manner, Respondent No 1 as the beneficiary of these wrongful actions, cannot seek any legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel in its favour.
If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it… ” 96. This, combined with the overriding public interest in having the land in LIA, Kota utilized for industrial purposes for the economic progression of the state or any revised purpose, as may be permitted by the State Government in public interest, leaves us in no doubt that Respondent No 1 has no further valid defences against the cancellation of the supplementary lease deeds. Thus, the High Court will consider the workers’ petition on its own merits, uninfluenced by anything that we have held in this judgment in the context of the dispute between the State Government, RIICO and Respondent No 1. While we are not in a position to direct or order the implementation of the AAIFR plan, we recall the earlier orders of this Court which had dismissed the workers unions’ SLP, and the subsequent Review Petitions on 17.08.2017 and 06.03.2018, but with a note that the rehabilitation plan should be implemented.
Case Title: BISHAMBHAR PRASAD Vs. M/S ARFAT PETROCHEMICALS PRIVATE LIMITED (2023 INSC 406)
Case Number: C.A. No.-002963-002963 / 2023
